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Lucia v. SEC: The Ambiguity of the
Appointments Clause Continues,
Sending Tremors Coursing
Throughout the Administrative
State
SAMUEL A. SCHWARTZ*©
In Lucia v. SEC,1 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Appointments Clause2 applies to the
administrative law judges (“ALJs”) of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”). Reversing
the decision below, the Court concluded that the ALJs are
inferior officers subject to the Appointments Clause.3
Properly understanding the Court’s precedent in Freytag,4
the Court correctly applied it to the SEC ALJs.5 However, the
Court’s narrow holding failed to clarify the meaning of
inferior officers under the Appointments Clause, leaving a
trail of uncertainty in its wake.6
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law. The author wishes to thank all of those that made this
paper possible—you know who you are.
© Samuel A. Schwartz 2019.
1 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
2 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
3 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018).
4 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
5 See infra Part IV.A.
6 See infra Part IV.B.
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I.

THE CASE

Alleging that Raymond Lucia fraudulently misled potential
clients, the SEC brought an administrative enforcement
action against Lucia in front of SEC administrative law judge
Cameron Elliot.7 Finding Lucia liable, the ALJ’s initial
decision8 imposed a civil penalty, lifetime bar from the
industry, and other sanctions.9 Appealing to the SEC, Lucia
contended10 that ALJs are officers of the United States who
must be appointed in accordance with the Appointments
Clause.11 Because Judge Elliot had been appointed by SEC
staff members, who undisputedly were not constitutionally
authorized to do so,12 Lucia argued that Judge Elliot’s
judgment should be vacated.13
Citing Landry,14 the SEC reasoned that the ALJs’ lack
of significant independent decision-making authority
necessarily made the ALJs employees and not inferior
officers.15 Relying on the lack of final decision-making
authority, the Landry Court held that the ALJs of the
Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2016) reh’g
en banc denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam). The SEC
alleged that Lucia had misled potential clients with slideshow
presentations about Lucia’s wealth management strategy. Id.
8 The Commission remanded the initial decision for further fact-finding
as to other charges, but the ALJ returned a revised initial decision with
identical sanctions. Id.
9 Id. at 283.
10 The SEC also rejected Lucia’s argument on the merits. Id.
11 Id.
12 The Commission itself counts as “Heads of Department.” Free Enter.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 511–13 (2010)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.). The SEC, however, had left the
task of appointing ALJs to SEC staff members who do not share the same
constitutional status as the Commissioners. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct.
2044, 2050 (2018).
13 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283.
14 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
15 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 283.
7

2

Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy

SAMUEL A. SCHWARTZ

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) were
employees and not inferior officers.16 Extrapolating Landry
to other agencies’ ALJs, the SEC rejected Lucia’s argument.17
Lucia appealed the SEC’s decision in federal court.18
Denying Lucia’s petition for review, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that
the ALJs are not officers governed by the Appointments
Clause.19 Lucia’s petition for an en banc rehearing was
subsequently denied in a per curiam order by a divided
court.20 Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted certiorari21
to decide whether the SEC ALJs are “inferior officers of the
United States”22 or simply employees of the federal
government.23
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Stipulating the constitutional framework for appointing
“officers of the United States,”24 the Appointments Clause25
dictates that only the President, with the advice and consent
of the Senate, may appoint principal officers, while Congress
may grant the power to appoint “inferior officers”26 to the
President alone, Courts of Law, or Heads of Departments.27
Id.
Id.
18 Id. at 280.
19 Id. at 285.
20 Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
21 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 736 (2018).
22 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
24 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. While not the focus of this Note, the Supreme Court has distinguished between principle and inferior officers. See, e.g., Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–63 (1997) (holding that an inferior officer is an
officer whose work is directed and supervised at some level by a principal
16
17
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Subordinate officials and employees, however, can be
appointed without comporting to the rigorous guidelines of
the Appointments Clause.28 In distinguishing between an
inferior officer and an employee, the Supreme Court has
generally held that an officer who occupies a “continuing
position established by law”29 and exercises “significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States”30 is
considered an inferior officer.31
Revolving around whether certain government
positions were intended by Congress to have the status of an
office, early Supreme Court Appointments Clause decisions
did not establish what is actually required for an official to
be deemed an inferior officer.32 Not until Freytag33 did the
Supreme Court directly address the difference between an
inferior officer and an employee.34 Freytag involved a
challenge to the constitutionality of the appointment of the
special trial judges (“STJs”) of the United States Tax Court.35
Applying the “significant authority”36 test, the Court held
that the STJs were considered inferior officers.37 The Court
primarily relied on the fact that the office of the STJs is
officer); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (listing four
factors to determine if an officer is a principal or inferior officer).
28 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam); accord
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (“[Employees] need not be
selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”).
29 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879).
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Germaine, 99 U.S. at 512 (holding that a civil surgeon could
not be prosecuted under a criminal statute applicable to “officers of the
United States guilty of extortion”) (internal citations omitted); cf. United
States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1867) (discussed in Germaine,
99 U.S. at 511).
33 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991).
34 Id. at 870–71.
35 Id.
36 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126.
37 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
4

Journal of Business & Technology Law Proxy

SAMUEL A. SCHWARTZ

“established by law,” the “duties, salary, and means of
appointment for that office are specified by statute,” and that
the STJs carry out “important functions [with] significant
discretion.”38
Although the Supreme Court had clearly held that the
STJs were inferior officers,39 the status of ALJs remained
unclear.40 Adjudicating the constitutionality of the ALJs of
the FDIC, Landry41 was the first court to deliberate on the
similarities between the STJs and ALJs.42 Distinguishing
Freytag, the Landry Court held that the ALJs were
employees and not inferior officers.43 Understanding the
critical factor in Freytag as the STJs’ final decision-making
power, the Landry Court reasoned that since the ALJs did
not have any final decision-making power the ALJs could not
be considered officers.44
Concurring in the judgment alone, Judge Randolph
argued that the ALJs were indistinguishable from the STJs
in Freytag and that they should be considered officers.45 In
Judge Randolph’s view, final decision-making authority was
not dispositive of Freytag.46 Rather, Freytag primarily
focused on the law establishing the office, the statutorily
defined duties, salary, and means of appointment, and the
significant discretion of the STJs.47 Because the ALJs and
Id.
Id.
40 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 507 n.10 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, §
2, cl. 2) (“Whether administrative law judges are necessarily ‘Officers of
the United States’ is disputed.”).
41 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1134.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1140 (Randolph J., concurring). Judge Randolph concurred with
the court’s holding to sustain the FDIC’s decision because there was no
prejudicial error. Id.
46 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142.
47 Id.
38
39
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STJs are similar in this regard, argued Judge Randolph, the
ALJs should be considered officers.48
In Landry’s wake, the main criteria for differentiating
between officers and employees was the significance of the
matters resolved by the officials, the discretion the officials
exercise in reaching those decisions, and the finality of those
decisions.49 Recently, however, lower federal courts have
been trending away from the Landry majority and towards
Judge Randolph’s concurrence.50 Finding ALJs to likely be
inferior officers, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia disregarded the Landry
majority’s reasoning, instead relying on Judge Randolph’s
understanding of Freytag.51
A circuit split soon followed.52 In nearly identical
circumstances involving an SEC ALJ, the D.C. Circuit
reaffirmed the Landry precedent in Lucia,53 while the Tenth
Circuit expressly rejected that analysis in Bandimere,54
holding that ALJs are officers because of Freytag. The dust
had barely settled on the Bandimere decision when the D.C.
Circuit deadlocked on an en banc petition to review the Lucia
Id.
Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
50 See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2015), vacated on
other grounds and remanded, 825 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2016); accord
Duka v. United States SEC, 124 F. Supp. 3d 287, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
51 Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.
52 Compare Raymond J. Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277, 285 (D.C. Cir.
2016), reh’g en banc denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (per curiam)
with Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc
denied, 855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017).
53 Lucia, 832 F.3d at 285.
54 Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1168.
48
49
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decision,55 setting the stage for clarification from the
Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the SEC ALJs.56
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING

Reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, the Supreme Court, in Lucia v.
SEC,57 concluded that the SEC ALJs are officers of the
United States.58 Writing for the majority, Justice Kagan first
noted the statutory authority of the SEC and the SEC’s
ubiquitous use of ALJs to administer its proceedings.59
Stressing that the ALJs were undisputedly not appointed in
accordance with the Appointments Clause, the Court noted
that if the ALJs were found to be officers then that would
invalidate the judgment.60 Briefly describing the Court’s
guidelines for distinguishing between officers and employees,
the majority noted that an officer must have both a
continuing position established by law and exercise
significant authority.61
Dancing away from elaborating on the significant
authority test, the Court relied on its application of a basic
significant authority test to determine that the ALJs are
officers.62 Holding that the Tax Court’s STJs were officers,
the Freytag63 Court relied on the fact that the office of the
STJ was established by law, the STJs served on a continuous
basis, and that their duties, salaries, and means of
868 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).
57 Id. at 2044.
58 Id. at 2051.
59 Id. at 2049.
60 Id. at 2051.
61 Id. (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1879); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126, n.162 (1976) (per curiam)).
62 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
63 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991).
55
56
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appointment were delineated by statute.64 Explaining the
Freytag Court’s reasoning, the majority emphasized that the
significant discretion of the STJs to conduct proceedings
determined that the STJs were officers even if they did not
have final decision-making authority.65
Brushing aside the amicus’66 attempts to distinguish
Freytag, the majority reasoned that the SEC ALJs were no
different than the STJs of the Tax Court.67 The ALJs receive
career appointments, their duties, salaries, and means of
appointment are all clearly stated in the statute, and they
wield significant discretion while conducting administrative
hearings.68 Mimicking federal judges presiding over a bench
trial, the ALJs and STJs examine witnesses, take testimony,
and rule on the admissibility of evidence.69 Seemingly
performing almost identical functions, explained the
majority, both the ALJs and the STJs have authority to
shape the administrative record and enforce compliance with
their discovery orders.70
Reinforcing its application of Freytag, the Court
reasoned that the ALJs should be officers, a fortiori.71 If the
STJs are considered officers even though the Tax Court must
always review their decisions for them to take effect, then the
ALJs, whose decisions do not necessarily need to be reviewed
by the SEC for them to take effect, must certainly be
considered officers.72 Finding the ALJs to be inferior
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052–53.
Id.
66 The Government switched sides in the briefing stage. Lucia, 138 S. Ct.
at 2050. Thereafter, the Court appointed an amicus to brief and argue the
case in support of the decision below. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018).
67 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053.
68 Id.
69 Id. (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2053–54.
72 Id.
64
65
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officers,73 the Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.74
Dissenting from the Court’s opinion, Justice
Sotomayor argued that the ALJs are not officers.75 Arguing
with the majority’s reading of Freytag, Justice Sotomayor
understood that the STJs’ final decision-making authority
was the reason that they were considered officers.76 In her
view, since the ALJs can never issue final decisions on their
own without an act of the Commission, the ALJs are
employees and not inferior officers.77
IV.

ANALYSIS

In Lucia v. SEC,78 the Supreme Court held that the SEC
ALJs are inferior officers of the United States.79 Correctly
identifying the Court’s precedential holding in Freytag, the
Court appropriately applied it to the SEC ALJs.80 However,
the Court’s narrow decision does not clearly define who is
considered an inferior officer under the Appointments
Clause.81
A. The Court Properly Identified and Applied
the Court’s Previous Holding in Freytag to
the ALJs of the SEC.
Holding that STJs are considered inferior officers, the
Freytag Court explains the duties and discretion exercised by
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054–55.
Id. at 2055–56. The Court’s remedy was to give Lucia new hearing in
front of a properly appointed ALJ other than Judge Elliot. Id.
75 Id. at 2067 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
79 Id. at 2050.
80 See infra Part IV.A.
81 See infra Part IV.B.
73
74
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the STJs, highlighting the law establishing the office of the
STJ as well as the statutory specification of their duties,
salary, and means of appointment.82 Through taking
testimony, ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and
enforcing compliance with discovery orders, elaborated the
Freytag Court, the STJs exercise significant discretion while
conducting administrative hearings.83 Concluding its
Appointments Clause discussion, the Freytag Court notes
that “even if the duties of the [STJs] under [the relevant parts
of the statute discussed above] were not as significant as we
and the two courts have found them to be, our conclusion
would be unchanged.”84 Pointing out that the government
had conceded that the STJs could issue final decisions in
limited circumstances, the Freytag Court concluded that the
STJs were at least inferior officers in those limited
circumstances.85 And since the STJs cannot be considered
inferior officers in part and employees in part, reasoned the
Freytag Court, the STJs must be inferior officers.86
The dissent purports that the Freytag Court reneged
on its initial significant discretion analysis and instead relied
upon a final decision-making analysis to reach its conclusion
that the STJs are officers.87 To read this into the Freytag
opinion is hard to swallow at best.88 The dissent construes
language in the Freytag opinion, “even if the duties . . . were
not as significant . . . our conclusion would be unchanged,”89
to mean that the court was going back on its original
analysis.90 In the eyes of the dissent, the Freytag opinion
disregards the significant discretion analysis, instead
Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
Id. at 882.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2067 (2018) (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
88 Id. at 2052 n.4 (majority opinion).
89 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
90 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2067 (Sotomayor J., dissenting).
10
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choosing final decision-making authority as the dispositive
factor for determining who qualifies as an inferior officer.91
Furthermore, argue the Court’s critics, the continuation of
the Freytag opinion mentions that an official cannot be an
inferior officer for some things but not others,92 which seems
unnecessary to a conclusive significant discretion analysis.93
Using a final decision-making analysis, the dissent argued
that Freytag is not applicable to the ALJs, since ALJs do not
have final decision-making authority.94
A close look at the Freytag opinion shows that this
argument is flawed95 and that the majority understood and
applied Freytag correctly.96 The very sentence that the
dissent understands to imply a new analysis and rejection of
the previous discussion actually expressly states that the
court is not retracing its analysis.97 “[E]ven if the duties of
the [STJs] . . . were not as significant as we . . . have found
them to be” wrote the Freytag Court, “our conclusion would
be unchanged.”98 If the Freytag Court’s analysis of the
significant discretion of the STJs was really irrelevant to the
Freytag Court’s conclusion, then how could the Freytag Court
refer to its previous analysis as its “conclusion”?99 At most,
the Freytag Court seems to be suggesting an alternative
holding, but the Freytag Court is clearly not disregarding its
Id.
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882.
93 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
94 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2067 (Sotomayor J., dissenting); see also Landry,
204 F.3d at 1134; accord Bandimere v. United States SEC, 844 F.3d 1168
(10th Cir. 2016) (McKay J., dissenting).
95 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph J., concurring).
96 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052 n.4 (majority opinion).
97 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph J., concurring).
98 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991) (emphasis added).
99 Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (Randolph J., concurring) (citing Freytag, 501
U.S. at 882).
91
92
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previous analysis.100 Correctly understanding that final
decision-making authority was not the only Freytag factor,
the Court also applied Freytag’s significant discretion
analysis to the ALJs appropriately.101
Furthermore, ALJs do have some final decisionmaking authority at times.102 The SEC has discretion to
review or decline to review an ALJ’s decision.103 When an
ALJ’s initial decision is declined review, however, the ALJ’s
decision is released untouched.104 Disregarding the notion
that the SEC’s choice to decline reviewing an ALJ’s decision
is enough to consider the ALJ’s decision unoriginal, the Court
soundly reasons that an ALJ’s independently published
decision is considered final.105
Another effort to differentiate Freytag notes that while
the ALJs’ decisions are reviewed de novo by the SEC, the Tax
Court defers to the STJs’ fact-finding upon reviewing a
decision.106 Arguably, the STJs are understandably inferior
officers because their fact-finding is assumed to be credible
while the ALJs should not be considered inferior officers
because their conclusions of fact are always reviewed de
novo.107 However, the assertion that the ALJs’ findings of fact
are always reviewed from scratch is not convincing, for the
SEC generally considers the SEC ALJs to be the ultimate
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052 n.4; accord Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142
(Randolph J., concurring); see also Bandimere, 844 F.3d at 1192 (Briscoe
J., concurring).
101 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2052.
102 Id. at 2053.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 2053–54.
105 Id.
106 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
107 Id.
100
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authority on resolving conflicting evidence, respecting their
ALJs’ conclusions of fact.108
Moreover, even if there is a slight difference in the
amount of deference granted to STJs and ALJs, the Court
correctly applied Freytag.109 Granting certiorari to decide the
constitutional separation of powers question presented to
it,110 the Freytag Court specifically disregarded the amount
of deference the Tax Court grants the STJs upon reviewing
the STJs’ decisions.111 And if the deference given to the STJs
was not at all relevant to the Freytag holding, then it cannot
be considered in Freytag’s application.112
The Court fittingly deflected an additional attempt to
distinguish Freytag on grounds that the STJs have more
authority to enforce compliance with discovery orders than
the ALJs.113 While STJs are authorized to punish contempt
of their discovery orders by fine or imprisonment, ALJs are
not.114 Nonetheless, dismissed the Court, ALJs have other
resourceful ways of encouraging compliance.115 The methods
of the STJs, while effective, are not the only way of exacting
cooperation.116 Suspensions, exclusions from proceedings,
and other tactics, are more than enough for the ALJs to
maintain cooperativeness with their discovery orders.117
Soundly reasoning that the ALJs power to punish contempt
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054 (internal citations omitted).
Id.
110 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991).
111 Id. at 874 n.3.
112 Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1141-42 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph J.,
concurring).
113 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2054.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
108
109
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was similar to the STJs, the Court properly applied the
Freytag holding to the ALJs of the SEC.118
B. The Court’s Narrow Holding Leaves the
Appointments Clause Uncertain and the Fate
of Federal Agencies’ ALJs Unclear.
Properly concluding that the ALJs are inferior officers, the
Court’s intricate fact-based analysis leaves no clear standard
for determining who qualifies as an inferior officer.119 The
Court’s analysis determines that any official whose office is
established by law, whose duties, salary, and means of
appointment are delineated by statute, and who exercises
significant discretion while conducting administrative
proceedings can be considered an inferior officer.120 Perhaps
Freytag is also congruent with the fact that final decisionmaking authority can also make an official an inferior
officer.121 It is not clear.122
Shying away from establishing a clear definition of
what is required to be an inferior officer under the
Appointments Clause,123 the Court’s narrow decision has left
lower courts struggling to implement the Court’s decision. 124
Recent Sixth Circuit decisions, however, seem to indicate
Id.
Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas J., concurring).
120 Id.
121 See supra text accompanying note 100.
122 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas J., concurring); see generally
Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”? 70 STAN. L.
REV. 443, 564 (2018); accord Jennifer L. Mascott, “Officers” In the
Supreme Court: Lucia v. SEC 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 305, 333 (2018).
123 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas J., concurring).
124 See, e.g., Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor, 898 F.3d 669 (6th Cir. 2018)
(determining the constitutionality of the ALJs of the Federal Mine Safety
and Health Review Commission considering the Court’s holding in
Lucia); see also Blackburn v. United States Dep't of Agric., No. 17-4102,
2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25824, *1–2 (6th Cir. Sept. 11, 2018).
118
119
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that Lucia is heralding in a new era for Federal ALJs.125
Invalidating the decision of an ALJ of the Federal Mine
Safety Commission, the Sixth Circuit expressly relied on
Lucia, holding that since the ALJ had not been appointed
properly126 the ALJ’s judgment was invalid.127 Similarly, in a
case in which a Department of Agriculture ALJ’s decision
was on appeal in front of the Sixth Circuit, a motion to
remand because of the Lucia decision was granted, and the
matter is still pending.128
Implications of a few Sixth Circuit decisions
notwithstanding, the future of Federal ALJs is far from
clear.129 Firmly entrenched throughout the various
administrative agencies, a total of 1,931 ALJs handle the
See, e.g., Jones Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669; see also Blackburn, 2018
U.S. App. LEXIS 25824 at *1–2; see generally Matthew C. McCann, The
Immediate Aftermath of SEC v. Lucia on Administrative Law, 2018
Emerging Issues 8681 (LexisNexis, Oct. 22, 2018).
126 The ALJ had been appointed by the Chief ALJ, who was not
constitutionally permitted to do so, but not the commission itself. Jones
Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669. The Commission itself, however, collectively
serves as Department Head and can constitutionally appoint ALJs. Lucia
v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 (2018) (“To be sure, the Commission itself
counts as a Head of Department.”) (internal citations omitted); see also
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 512–13.
127 Jones Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669 (“Lucia v. [SEC] holds that the SEC's
administrative law judges are inferior officers . . . . The same problem
haunts this case . . . . For these reasons, we vacate the Commission's
decision and remand to the Commission for fresh proceedings.”) (internal
citations omitted).
128 Blackburn, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 25824 at *1–2 (“The Department of
Agriculture moves to remand the case for further proceedings, consistent
with Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), because the ALJ was not
appointed consistent with the Appointments Clause at the time of her
decision.”). The motion was granted “for further proceedings consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision in Lucia v. SEC.” Id. (internal
citations omitted).
129 See generally Mascott, supra note 122 at 305; Matthew C. McCann,
The Immediate Aftermath of SEC v. Lucia on Administrative Law, 2018
Emerging Issues 8681 (LexisNexis, Oct. 22, 2018).
125
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bulk of all agency adjudication.130 Since most of the ALJs are
not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause,
the Court’s decision now threatens to potentially undermine
many of these ALJs’ decisions.131
Constitutional challenges to the validity of agency
ALJs are nothing new.132 The Court’s decision, however,
provides a powerful precedent to those challenging the
ALJs.133 The Social Security Administration (“SSA”),
Department
of
Agriculture,
Drug
Enforcement
Administration, and the Federal Mine Safety and Health
Review Commission are already facing post-Lucia challenges
in court.134 And for most of the other federal agencies, it
seems like it is only a matter of time.135
Employing 1,655 of the 1,931 ALJs working for federal
agencies,136 the SSA is perhaps the agency most threatened
by the Court’s decision.137 Almost immediately following the
Court’s decision, a slew of litigation targeting various SSA
ALJs’ decisions for lack of proper constitutional appointment
Administrative Law Judges by Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.opm.
gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-byAgency (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
131 See Mascott, supra note 122 at 333.
132 E.g. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Bandimere v.
United States SEC, 844 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc denied,
855 F.3d 1128 (10th Cir. 2017).
133 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL, GUIDANCE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES AFTER LUCIA V.
SEC (S. CT.), https://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/2018
0723/ALJ--SGMEMO.pdf.
134 See e.g., Jones Bros., Inc., 898 F.3d at 669; Blackburn, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25824, at *1-2; Morris & Dickson Co. v. Sessions et al, No. 5:18cv-01406, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 30394 (W.D. La. Oct 26, 2018)
(questioning the validity of DEA ALJs).
135 See Mascott, supra note 122 at 335.
136 Administrative Law Judges by Agency, OPM.GOV, https://www.
opm.gov/services-for-agencies/administrative-law-judges/#url=ALJs-byAgency (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
137 See generally Mascott, supra note 122 at 305.
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burst forth.138 Initially, courts largely deflected these claims
on technical grounds, reasoning that the claims had been
forfeited for not being raised properly at trial.139
This reprieve is ending.140 Reaching the merits of these
claims, some courts have already ordered the SSA to
reconcile their ALJ appointment scheme with the Court’s
decision.141 Although there has yet to be a final decision on
See e.g., Rick M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV-00283-JTR, 2018
BL 347095 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2018); Karl K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 2:17-CV-0304-JTR, 2018 BL 327903 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 11, 2018);
Karen S. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV-00302-JTR, 2018 BL 305890
(E.D. Wash. Aug. 24, 2018); Crystal F. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17CV-00174-JTR, 2018 BL 357432 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 25, 2018); Iwan v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-97-LRR, 2018 BL 324895 (N.D. Iowa Sept.
10, 2018).
139 See e.g., Rick M., 2018 BL 347095 at *3 n.2 (“To the extent Lucia
applies to Social Security ALJs, the parties have forfeited the issue by
failing to raise it in their briefing.”); Trejo v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 170879-JPR, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124738, at *3 n.3 (C.D. Cal. July 25,
2018) (“To the extent Lucia applies to Social Security ALJs, [the]
[p]laintiff has forfeited the issue by failing to raise it during her
administrative proceedings.”); see also Karl K., 2018 BL 327903 at *3 n.2;
Karen S., 2018 BL 305890 at *3 n.1; Stearns v. Berryhill, No. C17-2031LTS, 2018 WL 4380984 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 14, 2018); Blackburn v.
Berryhill, No. 0: 17-120-DCR, 2018 BL 385257 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 18, 2018);
Garrison v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-00302-FDW, 2018 WL 4924554
(W.D.N.C Oct. 10, 2018); Jodi M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-CV00291-JTR, 2018 BL 346069 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2018); Crystal F., 2018
BL 357432 at *3 n.1; Iwan, 2018 BL 324895 at *11; Davis v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-80-LRR, 2018 BL 324906 (N.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2018);
Thurman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-CV-35-LRR, 2018 BL 324870
(N.D. Iowa Sept. 10, 2018); Holcomb v. Berryhill, No. EDCV 17-1341-JPR,
2018 BL 229083 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2018).
140 See e.g., Blocker v. Colvin, No. 2:14-cv-02602-TLP-tmp, 2018 BL
323103 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 07, 2018) (“The Court has concerns as to
whether the holdings in Lucia v. SEC and Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of
Labor impact the validity of the decision issued by the Administrative
Law Judge in this case.”) (internal citations omitted).
141 Blocker, 2018 BL 323103, at *1 (“The Court has concerns as to whether
the holdings in Lucia v. SEC and Jones Bros., Inc. v. Sec'y of Labor impact
the validity of the decision issued by the Administrative Law Judge in
138
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the matter, pending litigation leaves the SSA struggling to
explain itself.142 The future of ALJs after the Court’s decision
is far from predictable, leaving agencies, practitioners, and
litigants unsure as to what to expect.143
CONCLUSION
In Lucia v. SEC,144 the Supreme Court concluded that the
ALJs of the SEC are inferior officers whose appointments are
governed by the Appointments Clause.145 Properly
identifying the holding in Freytag, the Court correctly
applied the Freytag factors to the SEC ALJs, rebutting
several attempts to distinguish Freytag.146 Correctly decided,
the Court’s decision clearly indicates that a change is coming
for Appointments Clause adjudication.147 Lower courts,
however, are struggling to implement the Court’s decision.148
And the narrowness of the Court’s decision leaves federal
agencies, administrative law practitioners, and litigants
wary of the vague future of ALJ adjudication.149
this case.”) (internal citations omitted); accord Faulkner v. Comm'r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:17-cv-01197-STA-egb, 2018 BL 275548 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 02,
2018) (Ordering the Social Security Commissioner to reconcile the Lucia
and Jones Bros. decisions) (internal citations omitted) (Order allowing
additional time to respond to order to show cause Oct. 2, 2018).
142 See, e.g., Parker v. Berryhill, No. 4:17cv143, 2018 BL 388232 (E.D. Va.
Oct. 22, 2018); Shelton v. Berryhill, No. 2:17cv609, 2018 BL 388233 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 22, 2018).
143 See Mascott, supra note 122 at 335.
144 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
145 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
146 See supra Part IV.A.
147 See supra Part IV.B.
148 See supra Part IV.B.
149 See supra Part IV.B.
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